In this paper, we develop a simple model that shows that consumption of PDS food grains is significantly different between rich and poor households in states where the PDS functions relatively well; in places where the PDS is non-functional, the difference is not significant. Using household-level data from three recent thick rounds of the consumption expenditure survey (2004-2005, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012), we find evidence in support of the predictions from the model. This suggests that one way to make the PDS functional is to make it more accessible to poor and underprivileged households.
times of distress and enhancing nutritional intake through access of food.
1 Furthermore, over time farmers have also become beneficiaries of the system. For instance, about 20% of the subsidies for purchase and distribution of cereals accrue to farmers (Himanshu and Sen, 2013a) . This is because the grains that are meant to be distributed to consumers through the PDS are first The operation of the PDS depends on the interplay of policies at the central and state levels. The central government procures certain food items, for instance rice and wheat, from farmers through the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and holds them in the FCI storage facilities.
Depending on pre-determined number of beneficiaries in different states under various welfare schemes and past utilisation of PDS food grains by the states, food grains are then allocated to the states. The state governments, in turn, are free to modify the central allocation by including more items for distribution, or by augmenting the quantity of an item, or by changing the issue price to be paid by beneficiaries.
However, the PDS has always had its detractors, who have emphasised the problem of corruption and leakage. A common measure of corruption in the system is called "diversion", which is the proportion of food grains collected by states from the central pool (allocated for various welfare schemes) that does not reach the intended beneficiaries. Data on central allocation (and offtake) for all states are available from the Foodgrain Bulletin of the Ministry of Food and Consumption
Affairs, Government of India; actual consumption of PDS food grains can be calculated from household-level data collected as part of the consumption expenditure survey (CES) conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). The gap between offtake and actual consumption is the amount lost. Dividing this by the offtake figure provides an estimate of diversion.
In [2004] [2005] , diversion for rice and wheat was about 54%, so that more than half of the rice and wheat released by the central government for the PDS did not reach the beneficiaries (Khera, 2011b) . Surely, a part of the diversion could be due to spoilage, losses during transportation and other incidental losses. But corruption appears to be a major flaw bleeding the system. In terms of temporal evolution, diversion has declined over the recent past: from 54% in 2004-05, it came down to 39.9% in [2009] [2010] , and then fell further down to 34.6% in 2011 -2012 (Himanshu and Sen, 2013a . 2 However, if close to or more than one-third of the food grains sent for the PDS gets stolen, the system can hardly be considered to be functioning well.
2 Our own calculations suggest that diversion in 2011-2012 is a little lower at 29.43% (see the last column in Table  1 ).
Critics have called for a radical change in the very mechanism of delivering food. For example, Kotwal et al. (2011) have advocated for dismantling of State procurement, transportation and distribution of food to the poor. Instead, they argue that the poor could be given cash entitlements (through biometric cards) to be redeemed with the purchase of food from a shop at market price. Since the shop owner gets the same amount of money whether she sells the grain to a PDS beneficiary or a non-beneficiary, there will be no incentive for diversion (assuming no extra transaction cost for PDS sale). This view essentially argues for (a) switching from in-kind to in-cash transfer to beneficiaries and (b) delinking procurement of grain from distribution of subsidised food. Such views are enormously influential, as evidenced by their acceptance in establishment circles. For instance, the National Food Security Bill passed by the Indian parliament in 2013 envisages "introducing schemes, such as, cash transfer, food coupons, or other schemes, to the targeted beneficiaries in lieu of their foodgrain entitlements…" (GOI, 2013) . In fact, the high rate of diversion lends credence to the charge that the present system of in-kind transfer of food is inefficient and leaky and has to be replaced by a more market oriented mechanism built on cash transfers.
Critics of the in-cash alternative point out that it may not be workable given the limited reach of markets, banks, power and other infrastructural facilities across much of the Indian countryside.
Moreover, the impact of an in-cash system on nutrition might be lower than the in-kind system.
For instance, by estimating a calorie demand function Himanshu and Sen (2013b) have empirically compared the impact of in-kind transfer with the equivalent in-cash transfer on calorie intake. They found that even in the absence of leakage costs in the in-cash transfer system, the in-kind system fared better: "a PDS transfer equal to 1% of out-of-pocket MPCE increases calorie intake by around twice as much as a 1% increase in out-of-pocket MPCE." This strong result is noteworthy given that (a) there has been a disconcerting decline of calorie intake in recent years (Basu and Basole, 2014) and (b) an important aim of PDS has always been to enhance nutritional intake. However the econometric results in the paper suffer from some problems that the authors themselves note. For instance, while estimating the calorie demand function real monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) is taken as an explanatory variable. It can be argued that calorie consumption and MPCE are jointly determined by the consumer. Hence it may be incorrect to posit the latter as a determinant of the former. Thus, the specification might suffer from problems of endogeneity.
In the present paper we seek to contribute to the discussion by exploring a different dimension of the problem. Although diversion figures are high and per household PDS consumption is low at the all-India level (these two are inversely related as we shall see later), the conditions are not uniformly dismal; there is a wide variation across states. Among the major states, Gujarat, Haryana, Punjab, and West Bengal had PDS consumption below the national average in 2011-2012 (see Table 1 ). On the other side, states like Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu reported PDS consumption of rice and wheat much above the national average in 2011-2012. In fact, the division between states with well-functioning and non-functioning PDS has been relatively stable for the past several decades (we call the former "functioning states" and the latter "non-functioning states"). While states like Gujarat, Haryana, Punjab and West Bengal have consistently performed below average, in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Himachal
Pradesh the PDS has performed much better than for the country as a whole. Thus, these states have always reported low diversion and high PDS consumption figures. While earlier researchers have emphasised this distinction between states, there have also been attempts to understand the determinants of well-functioning PDS systems through detailed field studies in Rajasthan (Khera, 2011c) .
[ Table 1 about here]
In this paper we take a different route: we use variation among rural areas across states and over time to understand factors that make a PDS relatively well-functioning. Our key hypothesis is that one of the important dimensions of the distinction between functioning and non-functioning states hinges on the degree of access to the PDS for socially and economically marginalised households: in functioning states, marginalised households have greater access to the PDS than in non-functioning states. Consequently, marginalized households consume more than privileged households in functioning states, but their consumption levels do not differ much in nonfunctioning states.
To be sure, functioning states perform better compared to non-functioning states for reasons that cannot be attributed to ensuring access to PDS for marginalized sections. Pro-active identification of BPL families and distribution of ration cards have a bearing on performance as well. Other state-specific initiatives have played their part too. However, our focus in this paper is on the access to PDS for the marginalized and its effect on consumption of PDS food grains.
We test the hypothesis regarding differential PDS consumption between privileged and marginalized households in functioning and non-functioning states using household-level data where consumption from PDS is high and diversion is low), households at the bottom of social and economic hierarchies get higher amounts of food from the PDS compared to those higher up in the hierarchies. In stark contrast, non-functioning states do not show this egalitarian trend of PDS consumption.
While this paper is similar in spirit to Khera (2011a) , we extend her analysis in two key respects: a more flexible specification of consumption and an investigation of the effects of socioeconomic hierarchies. First, we estimate a more flexible specification of the consumption of PDS food grains (rice and wheat taken together) by using the price of PDS food grains and the price of open market food grains as separate regressors, instead of using their difference as a regressor, as specified by Khera (2011a Khera's (2011a) analysis by using interstate variation to tease out some important determinants of a well-functioning PDS.
It is worth noting that our analysis has focused on rural areas only. This follows from our understanding that social divisions are likely to be more rigid and marginalisation more pronounced in rural areas. Thus, supply-side constraints, working through and reinforcing socioeconomic hierarchies, are likely to pose greater challenges for the PDS in rural areas. If a state government, aided no doubt by grassroots mobilisation, is able to nullify the deleterious effects of these socio-economic hierarchies, a process of self-selection and local enforcement is likely to take shape. This would allow the less privileged sections to continue to avail of their PDS entitlements. As a result, relatively higher shares of PDS allocations would be distributed. Thus, one would observe low diversion and high PDS food grain consumption (per household) in these states. A simple but powerful conclusion emerges from our study: one of the important requirements of a functional PDS has to do with the easing of supply-side constraints, working through and reinforcing socio-economic hierarchies, for marginalised sections of society.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II develops a simple economic model of consumer behaviour that helps us understand the key issues involved in thinking about the functioning of PDS. Section III introduces the data and the econometric strategy that is used to test the implications of the model developed in the previous section. Section IV presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes the paper by noting some caveats and pointing towards possible future directions of work.
II. A Simple Model
In this section, we develop a rudimentary single period model of consumer decision making in a two commodity world. The two commodities are the two types of food grains that the consumer can choose from: X (PDS food grain) and Y (open market food grain).The consumer has a fixed amount of money income, M, to spend on food grains, and the prices of X and Y are given by p x and p y respectively, where p y >p x . Let x and y denote consumption levels of the two goods respectively. Let q denote the maximum amount of X that a consumer can buy from the fair price shop (FPS), i.e., q is the official quota of PDS food grains. Her preference structure is as follows:
she prefers Y over X; and to fulfill her food requirements, the consumer wants to consume a minimum of c units of food grains.
The motivation for this specification of our model is simple. In the literature on the PDS, it is commonly understood that the rich (or the privileged) tend to opt out of PDS consumption. The reason has to do with the inferior quality of PDS food grains compared to the more expensive, and presumably higher quality, food grains available in the market (Balakrishnan and Ramaswami, 1997; Himanshu and Sen, 2011 Khera (2011a) where this distinction is not made. Note also in passing that inferiority may be defined in a broader sense than contained in the claim that PDS food grains are of inferior quality. For instance, there may be implicit costs involved in the purchase of PDS food (the trouble of visiting a fair price shop, which may not be selling the good at that time, or the compulsion of having to make a bulk purchase for a month and so forth), which may make it less attractive and hence inferior. From the above specification of preferences over the two commodities, X and Y, the demand functions can be calculated as follows.
The consumer is extremely poor and cannot afford to fulfill the required minimum quantity of food grains even with the poor quality cheap grain only.
• Case 1(a):q.p x ≤M Since she wants to consume a minimum quantity of grains, c, she will purchase the entire quota q of X. With the rest of her income, M -q.p x she purchases as much Y as possible.
Thus, * = , and * = − . .
• Case 1(b):M<q.p x
In this case her entire income is exhausted by consuming X. Hence, * = , and * = 0.
Case 2: M > c.p y
The consumer is rich enough to buy the better quality food grain, i.e., commodity Y. In this case, the consumption of X would be zero, and the entire income would be spent on Y. Hence, * = 0, and * = . To summarise, the rich consumer buys only Y. Thus, they are self-selecting themselves out of the PDS. The extremely poor consumer buys only X (except for the case where PDS quota is less than the minimum food requirement and the consumer has money left after spending on the quota). For the poor (not extreme poor), the consumption basket includes both X and Y. Note that if c> x*, the poor do not exhaust the entire PDS quota and spend a part of the income on the more expensive market food. This last result is different from Khera (2011a) .
It is important to note that x* is the demand for PDS food grains by the poor (the rich do not consume PDS food grains). But there is no guarantee that this would actually be realised. Our hypothesis is that the social and economic hierarchies operate in a manner which restricts the access of the marginalised to PDS. To see how this might operate, let q a denote the actual quota of PDS food grains for the socio-economically marginalised after different biases are taken into account. For instance, a dalit agricultural labour household might be given only half of the official quota by the owner of the fair price shop, with the rest sold off in the open market. Thus, if biases are strong, we will have the following: q>q a . Hence, if for a poor household x* >q a , actual consumption gets determined by q a -and does not attain the unconstrained value of x* (the optimal choice). Thus, in this case, = , where denotes actual consumption.
Moreover, when bias against the marginalised is high q a might be pushed down to zero so that actual PDS consumption of the socio-economically marginalised household may become close to zero. Recall that the rich and privileged households have zero PDS consumption by choice.
Thus, in states where bias is high, actual consumption levels of the privileged and the marginalised becomes numerically close (because both are close to zero), and the difference between the two is no longer significant. On the other hand, in states where the bias has been tamed to an extent, the marginalised will be relatively free to get their demanded quantity. Thus, x a will be close to x* and significantly different from the consumption of X by the privileged (which is close to zero by choice). 4 We summarise this key insight as It is also easy to understand why well-functioning states tend to remain so over long periods of time. Once a section of the people gets access to PDS benefits, it becomes difficult to take that away for fear of political backlash. A well-functioning PDS thus becomes self-sustaining. Thus, states like Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu not only have well-functioning PDS today, where per household PDS consumption is high and diversion low; these are the states where the PDS has been functioning well for several decades. For the purpose of this study, we use information on PDS and open market consumption -both quantity and value -for rice and wheat. While we use information on the quantity of consumption directly, we divide the value of consumption by the quantity to compute the price paid by households. This allows us to separately compute the price paid by households for purchase (of rice and wheat) from the PDS and from the open market. Since there is likely to be lot of noise in the price data at the household level, we use the simple average of household-level prices at the state-region level for our analysis. 6 In addition to data on PDS consumption and price, we also use data on household level characteristics and possession of Antyodaya and BPL (below poverty line) ration card.
7
A key purpose of this paper is to use the difference in the effectiveness of the PDS in functioning and non-functioning states. To distinguish between these two groups of states, we follow the classification used by Khera (2011b) . A state is categorised as a "functioning state" if average PDS consumption of food grains (rice and wheat) per capita has been more than 1 kg/month in the decade of the 2000s; a state is categorised as a "non-functioning state" if PDS consumption of food grains (rice and wheat) per capita has been consistently below 1 kg/month over the same period. Using this criterion, Khera (2011b) constructed the two groups as follows:
6 In NSSO surveys, each state is divided into several state-regions (some of the smaller states and union territories have one state-region) comprising of many districts. State-regions are the lowest level of aggregation at which NSS data is representative. Hence, we aggregate prices at the state-region and not at the level of districts. 7 Antyodaya households are the poorest among the BPL households. They are entitled to higher benefits than ordinary BPL households.
• Functioning States (NFS=0): Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu;
• Non-functioning States (NFS=1): Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Punjab.
What we are calling "non-functioning states" is referred to as "languishing states" by Khera (2011b) . She has a third category of states, "reforming states", which have shown improvement in PDS functioning over time; these states report average PDS food grain per capita consumption of roughly 1kg/month. To clearly capture the difference between the two, in this study we restrict our sample to functioning and non-functioning states only. Thus, the final sample for our empirical analysis includes rural households for the seven functioning and eight non-functioning states at three different time periods: 2004-2005, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012. Note that our definition of functioning and non-functioning states is consistent with various patterns of consumption by the privileged and non-privileged. For instance, the fact that functioning states have higher per capita PDS consumption can arise inter alia in either of the following two scenarios: (a) in functioning states consumption of PDS food grains is high but not significantly different for both privileged and under-privileged households; and (b) in functioning states consumption of PDS food grains is high for both privileged and underprivileged households, and under-privileged households consume significantly higher PDS food grains than the privileged. Our model points towards the second scenario -where the difference in the PDS consumption between the privileged and under-privileged is significantly differentand we will test this with household level data from rural India. From Table 2 , we can see some additional interesting trends: operational holdings and household size are both larger for non-functioning states; the proportion of illiterate population is higher in non-functioning states; the proportion of agricultural labour households and female-headed households is higher in the functioning states.
III.2. Econometric Methodology
The discussion in Section II suggests that PDS consumption is a function of prices, income and some other relevant factors (which had been abstracted from in the context of the model We would like to draw attention to one important point about interpretation of coefficients on the socio-economic variables in the econometric model in (1). The coefficient on any socioeconomic variable provides an estimate of the difference in PDS consumption between the socioeconomic category and the excluded category in functioning states (NFS=0). The coefficient on the interaction of the socio-economic variable and the non-functioning state dummy provides an estimate of the change in the difference in PDS consumption between the socio-economic category and the excluded category as we move from the functioning to the non-functioning states. Hence, the sum of the coefficient on any socio-economic variable and the coefficient on the interaction of that socio-economic variable and the non-functioning state dummy provides an estimate of the difference in PDS consumption between the socio-economic category and the excluded category in the non-functioning states (NFS=1).
To proceed to a discussion of the main results it might be useful to recall that we are interested in testing two key hypotheses: (a) that PDS consumption is supply-determined, which can be tested by seeing if the price of open market grains has a non-linear (hump-shaped) effect on consumption; and (b) PDS consumption of the privileged and the underprivileged is significantly different in functioning states but not so in non-functioning states.
[ Table 3 about here]
But before we present the results, we would like to present some indirect evidence for one of our assumptions: key socio-economic categories can function as good proxies for income. To establish this connection, we present average nominal monthly consumption expenditure (as a marker of income) for different socio-economic categories in 2004-2005, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 in Table 3 . Data in Table 3 show clearly that agricultural labour households are also the poorest in terms of consumption expenditure; their average MPCE was Rs. 446, Rs. 768 and Rs.
1080 respectively in 2004-2005, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 . This was the lowest MPCE among all the occupational groups. Moreover, the MPCE hierarchy remained unchanged over these years with the "other" category at the top, followed by "self-employed in non-agriculture", "selfemployed in agriculture", "other labour", and "agricultural labour". Turning to caste groups, we see a stable hierarchy as well: ST households are the poorest, followed by SC, OBC and other households. We see the same pattern for the education categories: illiterate households are the poorest, "above primary" households are the richest and "primary and below" are in the middle.
In terms of religion also, there is a pretty stable relationship: Christians are the richest, followed by "other religions", and Hindus, with Muslims being the poorest. For gender, we see an unexpected but stable pattern: female-headed households are richer than male-headed households. The evidence in Table 3 is only suggestive and is meant to convey the fact that there is a relatively stable relationship between socio-economic hierarchies and income. This allows us to use these socio-economic categories as reliable proxies for income. Table 4 presents results of estimating the model in (1) Table 4 . To compare the results between the two samples, we also estimate the model without the BPL-plus variable for Pooled 1 and report the results under specification (2) in Table 4 .
IV. Results and Discussion
[ Table 4 about here]
IV.1. Diversion of PDS Food Grains
Our first hypothesis is that PDS consumption is not completely demand determined; it is also determined by the operation of the following supply behaviour that open market price has a non-linear (hump-shaped) effect on PDS consumption. In fact, the result for specification (1) in Table 4 suggests that when open market price is higher than 20. 9 It is possible that expectations of future open market prices have an impact on PDS consumption through the following mechanism: FPS owners are more likely to hoard PDS food grains if they expect the open market price to increase in the future; this might reduce the supply, and hence the consumption of PDS food grains. While this is a plausible mechanism, we do not have data on expected prices. Hence, we cannot include expected price as a control. While this might give a biased coefficient on price variables (if current and expected prices are correlated), it will not affect our main results to any significant extent. This is because all non-price regressors -most of which are household level characteristics -in the empirical model can be expected to be independent of prices.
This has an important implication. In the presence of binding supply constraints, the issue of access to the PDS becomes very important in determining consumption of PDS food grains by individual households. It is no longer a matter of demand alone. Some households are not able to purchase the amount they demand. In such a scenario, gradients of social power can be used to limit access of the underprivileged to PDS entitlements. On the one hand this would reduce PDS consumption; on the other, it would increase diversion.
Before we turn to investigating this issue through our second hypothesis regarding the difference in PDS consumption between privileged and under-privileged households, let us analyse four important effects: wealth, household size, ration card (BPL or Antyodaya) and non-functioning states. Since the CES does not have data on total wealth, we use the size of the operational land holding as a proxy for wealth. Recall that we have restricted our analysis to rural areas, which is still dominated by agriculture. Hence, size of the operational holding is likely to be a good proxy for wealth. 10 In specifications (1) (2), and (3) in Table 4 , the coefficient on operational holding of land is negative but statistically insignificant; the coefficient on the interaction of land with the dummy for non-functioning states is positive, but again insignificant. This implies that the effect of landholding is not very strong on PDS consumption in either groups of states.
In all the three specification in Table 4 , household size has a positive and statistically significant effect on PDS consumption. The estimates suggest that a household with one more member will roughly consume 0.8 kg more food grains from the PDS. This positive effect is the result of two factors. One the supply side, larger household size might increase the PDS entitlement of the households; on the demand side, more household members mean more food requirement and also that the chance of someone from the family going to the fair price shop at the relevant time to purchase PDS food grains increases.
In specification (1) in Table 4 , the coefficient on the ration card (BPL or Antyodaya) dummy is 10.069; hence, households that possess Antyodaya or BPL ration cards consume 10.069 kgs more food grains than those that do not. The interaction term (ration card X non-functioning states) is positive (3.125) and statistically insignificant. Hence, in non-functioning states households with ration cards consume about 13 kgs more PDS grains per month than households without ration cards. When we recall that functioning states have significantly higher proportion of households with ration cards than non-functioning states (see Table 2 for details), this throws light on an interesting dimension: functioning states do better at increasing access to the PDS by distributing ration cards, but do worse off in converting each ration card into PDS purchase.
Hence, one way in which non-functioning states can improve is to be more pro-active in identifying BPL households and distributing ration cards.
In all the three specifications in Table 4 , the coefficient on the non-functioning state dummy is large and negative (-10.13 in the first specification) and strongly statistically significant; on the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction of the non-functioning state dummy with year dummies is not significant. The negative effect of the non-functioning state dummy suggests that even after controlling for prices, household level characteristics, and state region fixed effects, PDS consumption is significantly lower for all households in non-functioning states (NFS=1) in comparison to functioning states (NFS=0). 11 This result indicates that there is a relatively large and constant premium (in terms of PDS consumption) that attaches to households in functioning 11 The fact that the coefficient on the interaction of the NFS dummy with the year dummies are not statistically significant suggest that the effect does not change over time.
states even after accounting for prices, socio-economic biases and possession of ration cards.
While in this paper we have investigated the effect of socio-economic biases on PDS consumption, and therefore focused on the difference in PDS consumption between privileged and under-privileged households, other factors that operate on all households are also important.
These could be investigated in the future.
IV.2. Socio-Economic Hierarchies and PDS Consumption
The key insight of the economic model developed in Section II is that PDS consumption of the privileged and under-privileged differ significantly in functioning states (NFS=0) but might be close to each other in non-functioning states (NFS=1). We can test this insight using the results reported in Table 4 for different dimensions of social hierarchy.
Let us begin with the dimension of caste. Our data set allows us to classify households into four caste/ethnicity groups: scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST), other backward castes (OBC) and others, with the last category referring to the privileged sections. In the regression, we leave out the dummy for "others" (upper caste group) and make it the reference caste group.
In specification (1) in Table 4 , the coefficients on the ST and OBC dummies are positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, in functioning states, PDS consumption of ST and OBC households are not different from "other" households (the excluded caste category). But the coefficient on the SC dummy (0.992) is positive and significant. Hence, in functioning states, SC households consume more PDS food grains than upper caste (the excluded category) households.
[ The result in Table 5 shows that the difference in PDS consumption between SC/OBC and upper caste households is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero at standard levels of significance; but the difference in PDS consumption between ST and upper caste households is negative and statistically significant. Thus, the results in Turning to the dimension of religion, we see that the results for all specifications in Table 4 are statistically insignificant. The reference religion category is Hindu (the privileged group).
access to religious minorities. For instance, the difference in PDS consumption between Muslims and Hindus (the excluded religion category) is not significantly different in functioning states (the coefficient on the Muslim dummy is 0.171 but insignificant); neither is the difference in this dimension between functioning and non-functioning states important (the coefficient on the interaction term with the Muslim dummy is -0.59 but insignificant).
When we turn to the dimension of formal education, we use illiterates (the least privileged) as the reference group. For specification (1) in Table 4 , the coefficient on "primary and below" is insignificant. Thus, the difference in PDS consumption between "primary and below" households and illiterate households (the excluded category of educational category) is not significant in functioning states. But the coefficient on the "above primary" category is negative (-0.943) and significant, suggesting that in functioning states, households with above primary schooling consume 0.943 kg less PDS food grains than illiterate households. To see how this difference looks in non-functioning states, we can turn to Table 5 . In non-functioning states the difference in PDS consumption between illiterate and "above primary" households is not statistically different from zero (the difference is 0.306 and the p-value is 0.41). In sum, Tables 4 and 5 show that functioning states are able to ensure higher PDS consumption for the underprivileged (illiterate households) relative to privileged households (those with aboveprimary schooling); but we do not observe a significant difference in PDS consumption between under-privileged and privileged households in non-functioning states.
The next dimension of socio-economic hierarchy in our analysis is occupation. We have data on five categories of occupation -self-employed in non-agriculture, agriculture labour, other labour, self-employed in agriculture and other -and use agriculture labour (the least privileged) as the reference category. In specification (1) in Table 4 , we see that the coefficient on "self-employed in non-agri" dummy to be -1.444 and strongly significant. This means that in functioning states, households that are self-employed in the non-agricultural sector consumer 1.444 kg less PDS food grains than agricultural labour households (the excluded occupation category). We see similar results for "self-employed in agriculture" and "other" (professionals): both these groups consume significantly less PDS food grains than agricultural labour households in functioning states.
To see how these differences in PDS consumption operate in non-functioning states, we use the results in Table 5 . The striking result in Table 5 is that the difference in PDS consumption between agricultural labour households and each of the other occupation categories are not significantly different from zero in non-functioning states. For the categories of "self-employed in non-agriculture", "self-employed in agriculture", and "other" (professionals), the null hypothesis of the equality in average PDS consumption between agricultural labour households and these groups of households cannot be rejected at standard levels of statistical significance. If occupation is roughly congruent with class position, then Tables 4 and 5 show a striking result.
Functioning states manage to ensure more PDS food grains to those occupying the lowest position in the class hierarchy (agricultural labour households) relative to those above (selfemployed in agriculture, self-employed in agriculture, and professional households); in nonfunctioning states we do not observe this difference.
The last dimension of socio-economic hierarchy that we analyse is gender. We capture the effect of gender by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for female-headed households and 0 otherwise. In all specifications in Table 4 , we see that the sign on the female-headed household dummy is negative and significant. This means that in functioning states, female-headed households consume less PDS food grains than male-headed households. For instance, according to specification (1) in Table 4 , female-headed households consume 1.497 kg less PDS food grains than male-headed households in functioning states. The apparent anomaly in this result vanishes once we recall that female-headed households are richer than male-headed households (as we see in Table 3 ). The economic model in section II predicts that poorer households will consume more PDS food grains in functioning states, and that is what we find with regard to female-headed households. On the other hand, the result in Table 5 shows that the female-headed consume 1.227 kg per month more PDS food grains than male-headed households in nonfunctioning states. This result is surprising and unexpected. Given that female-headed households are richer in terms of MPCE -as seen from Table 3 -one would have expected to see at most equal PDS consumption between these and male-headed households. The fact that female-headed households consume 1.227 kg per month more PDS food grains than maleheaded households, according to results in Table 5 , might be because the category of "femaleheaded" household is not good for capturing gender biases. It may be more appropriate to explore alternative categories for better capturing gender bias in future research.
To summarise the results in this sub-section we would like to highlight two points: (a) for key socio-economic dimensions of privilege, functioning states manage to provide higher PDS consumption to the underprivileged; and (2) in non-functioning states, the observed consumption of PDS food grains is not significantly different between underprivileged and privileged households.
To interpret these result, recall that socio-economic dimensions of privilege are strongly correlated with income (according to the indirect evidence in Table 3 ); thus, those occupying lower positions in the socio-economic hierarchy are also poorer. The model in section II suggests that the demand for PDS food grains will be higher for these underprivileged groups. The fact It is worth noting that our results paint a different picture for religion. While Hindus (the excluded religion category in Table 4 ) are not the richest group, Muslims have the lowest MPCE (see Table 3 ). Thus, one would have expected to see some significantly higher consumption of PDS food grains by Muslims in functioning states. The fact that we do not see this result in Table   4 perhaps points to the fact that even while addressing many socio-economic biases, wellfunctioning states have not been able to address the bias that flows from the religion of households.
Another interesting dimension of the results presented in Table 4 emerges from a comparison of specification 1 and 2. Recall that the only difference between the two specifications is the inclusion of the dummy for the possession of ration cards (BPL or Antyodaya) in specification 1 and its exclusion in specification 2. A comparison of the coefficients on the different caste, education, and occupation categories show that the magnitude (and statistical significance) is lower in specification 1. For instance, in specification 2, the coefficient on ST is 3.199 and statistically significant; but the corresponding coefficient in specification 1 is 0.929 and statistically insignificant. We see a similar pattern for the coefficients on SC, OBC, above-primary, and all the occupation categories. This means that in functioning states, a significant reason for larger PDS consumption by under-privileged households comes from the possession of ration cards (BPL or Antyodaya). This is another piece of evidence in support of the claim that one of the important ways in which non-functioning states could improve their PDS delivery and reach is by pro-actively identifying and distributing ration cards to BPL households.
IV.3. PDS Consumption and Diversion
As we had indicated above there is a negative relationship between PDS consumption and diversion of PDS food grains made available by the central government to individual states. This is easy to see: if households in a state manage to consume more food grains from the PDS, less is available to be diverted to the open market. Hence, in a mechanical fashion, high consumption from PDS leads to lower diversion (once we take account of state-level offtake) and vice versa.
To see that this is indeed the case, in Figure 1 we show a scatter plot of PDS consumption and diversion -recall that diversion is defined as one minus the ratio of NSS consumption and statelevel offtake -across Indian states in 2011-2012. Data for the scatter plot is from Table 1, and we include a regression line to capture the statistical relationship between the two variables. The regression line in Figure 1 has a negative slope of 2.89 that is statistically significant. This means that across Indian states in 2011-2012, an increase in PDS consumption by 1 kg/household is associated with 2.89 percentage point lower diversion.
[ Figure 1 about here]
V. Conclusion
The public distribution system in India has attracted lot of academic and policy attention in recent years. Critics have highlighted the leakage and corruption that plague the system and some have called for the replacement of the existing in-kind subsidy system by an in-cash We construct a simple one-period two-commodity consumer choice model to think about this issue. In our model, households choose between PDS food grains and open market food grains to meet a minimum requirement under a given budget constraint. We show that consumption of PDS food grains will differ significantly between rich (or privileged) and poor (underprivileged) households in states where supply constraints on the poor are not stringent. On the other hand, in states where supply constraints are stringent and binding, consumption of PDS food grains will not differ significantly between rich and poor households.
Using household-level consumption data from the three most recent "thick" rounds of the consumption expenditure survey of the NSSO, we test our hypothesis in two steps by estimating a regression model with a pooled data set. In the first step, we establish that PDS consumption is not completely demand determined; it is impacted by supply constraints arising from the diversion of PDS food grains to the open market by FPS owners. In the second step we show that in states where the PDS is relatively well functioning, households lower down in the caste hierarchy, in the occupational hierarchy, and in the educational hierarchy consume more PDS food grains than those higher up in the hierarchy. We find no such egalitarian effect in states where the PDS has not been functioning well. This provides evidence in support of our hypothesis: taming socio-economic biases will help in improving the reach and delivery of the PDS. One important set of factors that makes states better at delivering PDS food grains to its citizens is probably a combination of pro-active public policy and grassroots mobilisation that counters the influence of socio-economic hierarchies in generating supply constraints for underprivileged households. 13 Our results suggest that pro-active state policy in identifying and distributing ration cards to BPL (and Antyodaya) households could be one straightforward way to improve the reach, delivery and performance of the PDS.
We would like to end by pointing out that the analysis in this paper addresses concerns raised in Kotwal et al. (2011) and Khera (2011a) . Commenting on the argument that the existing in-kind PDS can be reformed, Kotwal et al. (2011) point out that such a case cannot be made on the basis of two relatively successful states only, Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh. In this paper, we have moved beyond individual states and compared the performance of seven well-functioning with eight non-functioning states. Hence, the analysis in this paper addresses the concern raised in Kotwal et al. (2011) that "[two] relative successes do not convincingly swing the case in favour of PDS, when the system has failed consistently in most states.'' Coming at the issue from an opposite end, Khera (2011a) argues that aggregate all-India level analysis is not meaningful because of differences in the PDS across states. While it is certainly true that there are many differences among states with regard to the PDS, this does not detract from aggregate analysis. In fact, by classifying states into three broad categories -functioning, 13 Some of the concrete measures that have probably contributed to mitigating the effects of socio-economic biases are (a) the replacement of privately run fair price shops with those run by cooperatives (Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh), (b) the establishment of fair price shops operated by women (Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh).
reforming and languishing - Khera (2011b) highlights the commonality among the many states that fall into each of these categories. In this paper, we extend the analysis in Khera (2011b) and investigate the reasons that make the PDS function well in some states. In our analysis, we recognise the importance of state-level variation and take account of their effects in our empirical model with state-level dummies.
One possible drawback of the analysis in this paper is that it uses a pooled data set for estimating the empirical model. Hence, we are unable to control for household-level unobserved heterogeneity. In future research, it might be useful to explore the option of either constructing pseudo-panel data sets at the district or state-region level, or using fieldwork to construct a panel data set at the household level. Both these approaches would address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. 
